

CONFIDENTIAL

13 May 1947

I talked with [] of FBIB and discussed the matter of setting up 3 to 5 security classifications. I told [] it was my understanding from [] that this suggestion had been made originally by FBIB to alleviate their difficulties in acquiring new personnel. This entire subject was explored at length with [] and a physical survey was made in his company of the operations of the Branch. This survey confirmed that many of their operations are of an unclassified intelligence nature. [] said he was not in favor of establishing a number of security classifications as he thought this would be bad for the morale of employees. When questioned on this point he explained that in his opinion it would be a tendency among employees to question why they were in one security classification and fellow employees whom they knew quite well were in another.

[] said that the recruitment problem of this Branch could be solved rather simply if employees could be hired without investigation for a temporary period of 3 months. During this temporary period the complete investigation could be made and it was not his thought that the investigation should be waived but rather that it should be postponed. He said further that employees hired under this arrangement would be strictly confined to work classified no higher than restricted. He explained further that the classification of restricted ~~would not be~~ because of intelligence reasons but because of legal reasons with respect to the release of information []

[] also said that this plan of ³ months temporary hire had been broached to General Sibert and [] and both were in agreement as to its feasibility. [] said he understood that the matter had been taken up with higher authority. A decision was arrived at not to accept such a plan. To my way of thinking the acceptance of this plan would be a simple administrative operation and would obviate any need for revising the security policies of the CIG.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

12 May 1947

25X1A

I examined the ICAPS report referred to in paragraph 3 of the attached and [] had made a survey of FBIB and noticed that a number of the personnel were doing unclassified work. This personnel was employed at such routine jobs as mimeographing operators, messengers, etc. and recommendation was set forth for consideration that the Security Branch, OCD make a study of the various classes of personnel employed in CIG with the view of setting up 3 to 5 security classifications and then examining each position and assigning to it one of these classifications. [] told me that in his talk with [] told him he was having difficulty in finding employees. The security clearance took so long that prospective employees in some instances ~~had declined or~~ had decided not to wait and had procured themselves other positions.

25X1A

25X1A

I talked with Lt. Col. Barton about setting up 3 to 5 security classifications based upon an analysis of jobs from the standpoint of whether they were handling classified intelligence information. Barton said that he was very much opposed to changing present investigative procedures, however, he did not object in certain instances such as employees for [] FBIB operations to have the investigative findings waived as concerns certain derogatory information. He raised the point that if personnel were hired without complete investigation that it might be possible for Communists or Communist Sympathizers to be employed by CIG and he believed from a public relations standpoint CIG would wish to give careful consideration to this possibility. I told Barton that I would talk with other people in CIG and would probably be back to have another talk with him.

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL